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AbstrAct: The US Army is under pressure. If  trends persist, it will 
soon shrink to its smallest size in nearly 70 years. While there are 
sound arguments for the current drawdown, reasonable policies can 
still yield unintended consequences. In particular, we argue Ameri-
can landpower helps make America’s conventional and nuclear se-
curity guarantees credible. Since these guarantees stabilize alliances, 
deter aggression, and curb nuclear proliferation, landpower’s relative 
decline could have serious implications for the broader security situ-
ation of  the United States. 
The US Army is under pressure. Shifting strategic priorities, espe-cially the rebalance to East Asia, necessarily emphasize naval and air power.1 Budget constraints make it tempting to substitute 
manpower with technology.2 Domestically, Americans have little appetite 
for putting “boots on the ground” after years of  war in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Beyond geography, economics and politics, an even more potent 
threat looms: many strategists believe precision weapons are revolution-
izing warfare in ways that diminish landpower’s usefulness.3 Although 
armies have often been the most important source of  military power, 
because they alone have the ability to defend, conquer, and occupy terri-
tory, precision weapons threaten to turn that capability into a liability.4 As 
the argument goes, on future battleields, slow-moving armor, artillery, 
and infantry units will have nowhere to hide as precision-guided muni-
tions (PGMs) rain down upon them. 
American defense planners have responded to these trends by shift-
ing resources away from the Army.5 There are certainly sound arguments 
1      See Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia 
(London: Routledge, 2014); Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 19, 2010); Andrew Krepinevich, Maritime Competition 
in a Mature Precision-Strike Regime (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
2014); T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conlict,” Strategic 
Forum, no. 278 (June 2012): 1-14; and Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and 
Consequences of  an American Naval Blockade of  China,” Journal of  Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 
385-421. 
2      Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age (Washington, 
DC: Center for New American Security, January 2014). 
3      On how PGMs would alter warfare, see Thomas Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth and 
Spread of  the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus 140, no. 3 (2011): 45-57. For an alternative view, 
see Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004).
4      John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of  Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001): 
83-137. 
5      By iscal year 2018 the active-duty Army will complete its planned end-strength reduction from 
565,000 to 450,000 soldiers. “Army Announces Force Structure, Stationing Decision,” Department of  
Defense News, July 9, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/612623. The Army 
National Guard’s end-strength is set to decrease by 15,000 by 2017. “Army Guard to see reductions, 
changes in personnel and force structure,” National Guard Bureau, November 6, 2015, http://www.
nationalguard.mil/News/ArticleView/tabid/5563/Article/627489/army-guard-to-see-reductions-
changes-in-personnel-and-force-structure.aspx. 
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behind the current drawdown, including the Asia-Paciic Rebalance 
and a strong aversion to large-scale counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, 
even reasonable policy decisions can sometimes yield unintended con-
sequences. Speciically, we argue as geopolitical priorities, technological 
advances, and budgetary constraints undercut American landpower, 
allies and adversaries may increasingly question America’s conventional 
and nuclear security guarantees. Since these guarantees stabilize alli-
ances, curb nuclear proliferation, resolve security dilemmas, and deter 
aggression, landpower’s relative decline could have serious implications 
for the broader security situation of the United States. 
We proceed as follows. We irst explain why landpower makes 
American threats and promises more believable. It does so in two ways. 
The irst is well understood: ground troops signal the United States has 
“skin in the game.” However, strategists have largely overlooked our 
second observation: American troops reassure allies because allies think 
American troops can punish, compel, and ultimately defeat an unde-
terred adversary.6 Put simply, forward deployed soldiers and marines 
are more than just trip-wires and hostages. Allies do not have faith in 
American commitments because American troops might die; they have 
faith because American troops can kill and win. If deterrence and assur-
ance were simply about having “skin in the game,” America could signal 
its commitment on the cheap by deploying unarmed conscripts.7 
We also identify three policy recommendations that low from our 
analysis. First, the United States should halt further cuts to Army force 
structure. Our analysis suggests the United States must retain a sizable 
forward-based presence in Europe and East Asia. Although budget cuts 
make it tempting to replace forward-based troops with rotational train-
ing and prepositioned equipment, attempts to reassure allies “on the 
cheap” are unlikely to work in a world where precision and anti-access/
area-denial (A2AD) threats make it hard to introduce ground forces 
once the shooting has begun. Moreover, events in Iraq and Syria demon-
strate the United States must retain its ability to wage counterinsurgency 
operations despite its desire to avoid them.8 Second, the Joint Force must 
prove to American allies it has a doctrine that allows it to seize and hold 
ground in an A2AD threat environment. It is not yet obvious that the 
United States can reliably introduce and resupply ground forces against a 
irst-rate opponent with robust A2AD capabilities. Third, the Army must 
similarly develop a viable war-ighting doctrine and associated tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs) to operate in a PGM-dominated 
environment. Incremental adaptation might sufice to keep American 
landpower relevant, but wholesale innovation may prove necessary. 
The Challenges of Making Security Guarantees
Security guarantees, including multilateral alliances like the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and bilateral defense treaties (e.g., Japan), 
6      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex 
World (Fort Eustis, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014): 16.
7      Though the United States did intentionally let families live with forward deployed troops dur-
ing the Cold War to enhance the tripwire effect of  those forces, the government did not deploy fami-
lies without troops. It invested heavily to ensure those troops were well trained and well equipped. 
8      Francis G. Hoffman, “What the QDR Ought to Say about Landpower,” Parameters 43, no 4 
(Winter 2013-14): 7-14.
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enhance American security.9 They allow the United States to gener-
ate more power by leveraging the capabilities of like-minded partners 
than it could on its own. They deter conlict by threatening to bring 
combined power to bear on a potential adversary if it threatens an 
ally. For deterrence to work, an adversary must believe undertaking a 
certain action will result in a penalty that exceeds any possible gain.10 
Moreover, security guarantees moderate tensions by assuring allies they 
do not need to pursue nuclear weapons or engage in risky behaviors to 
improve their security. Finally, they resolve security dilemmas between 
American allies and their local adversaries.11 Security dilemmas occur 
when one state tries to make itself more secure, inadvertently making 
other states feel less secure in the process.12 For example, suppose Japan 
were to develop nuclear weapons to deter China. If China misreads 
Japanese intentions, it might grow alarmed and respond by adopting a 
more aggressive posture. The result could be a destabilizing arms race. 
Security guarantees prevent such dynamics from unfolding.
American security guarantees only work when allies and adversaries 
believe them. Unfortunately, the nature of international politics is such 
that states have dificulty trusting one another, especially when security 
and survival are at stake.13 Although the United States can promise to 
intervene on an ally’s behalf in a crisis, the ally knows no international 
court, police force, or coalition has enough power to force the United 
States to fulill its pledges. Especially because it is so powerful, the 
United States always has the option to renege if it changes its mind.14 
For example, the US president might decide not to defend an ally if an 
imminent war appears more costly than the United States anticipated 
when it entered into the alliance. As Taiwan discovered in the 1970s, the 
United States can unilaterally terminate formal treaties when its cost-
beneit calculus changes. 
The degree to which other states see the United States as a credible 
ally or adversary depends on how they answer two questions. First, do 
they think the United States is willing to do what it says it will do, espe-
cially in a crisis situation? Second, is the United States able to do what it 
says it will do? The less an ally or an adversary trusts American willing-
ness or ability, the less it will believe American security guarantees. 
These questions are important because the United States becomes 
less secure when its allies and adversaries start to question its credibility. 
All things equal, the more an ally worries the United States will renege 
in a crisis, the more likely it is that the ally will prepare as though it will 
have to go it alone in a conlict.15 Arms build-ups, offensive posturing, 
9      Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of  the United States of  America (Washington DC: 
The White House, February 2015), 6. 
10      Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence and Reassurance: Lessons from the Cold War,” Global 
Dialogue 4, no. 2 (2000): 119-120. Emphasis in original. 
11      Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East,” in 
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Paciic, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastundono (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), 25-26.
12      Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 
1978): 186.
13      Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of  International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
14      Reneging is never costless, but it can be less costly than fulilling a promise that leads to war.
15      Loose commitments provoke abandonment fears. See Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
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and nuclear weapons acquisition are all possible behaviors. The same 
logic holds for potential adversaries. They also know the United States 
can shirk from or renege on its guarantees. The more a potential adver-
sary doubts American credibility, the less it will trust American efforts 
to restrain allies and American threats to intervene or retaliate. In both 
cases, the lack of credibility can encourage aggressive behavior.16
Making credible conventional security guarantees is dificult, but 
making believable nuclear security guarantees is even trickier. The 
United States has long promised to use nuclear weapons to defend its 
most important allies. This strategy of extended nuclear deterrence 
serves two purposes. It deters nuclear-armed adversaries (as well as 
those with massive, local conventional advantages) from blackmailing 
our allies.17 It also helps to limit nuclear proliferation by convincing 
allies that acquiring their own nuclear arsenals is unnecessary.18
Yet promises to use nuclear weapons must entail ambiguity.19 
Conventional alliance treaties can be explicit about the conditions 
under which the United States will militarily support an ally. With 
nuclear security guarantees, the United States cannot draw such clear 
trigger lines. It must keep adversaries uncertain of its threshold for using 
nuclear weapons. Otherwise, adversaries can launch attacks against the 
ally knowing the United States will prefer to stay neutral so as not to 
risk nuclear war. Unfortunately, the ambiguity that keeps adversaries 
off-guard does the same to allies. And the more an ally fears the United 
States might not use nuclear weapons on its behalf, the more likely the 
ally will try to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. 
How Landpower Helps Generate Credibility
Landpower—particularly forward-deployed landpower—helps 
American security guarantees appear more credible. It shapes how 
other states perceive America’s willingness and ability to implement its 
promises and threats. 
To clarify, the beneits of landpower we describe below exist when 
the overriding political objective is to defend an ally from external 
aggression. These beneits might not exist if the goal is to support a 
domestically unpopular regime face its internal enemies. In such cases, 
landpower could become a liability if its presence can provoke resentment 
from the local population and become a target for counterinsurgency.
American Willingness
Strategists and international security scholars have long understood 
that putting ground troops on an ally’s territory is one of the most 
16      On how past actions shape credibility and thus crisis negotiations, see Alex Weisiger and 
Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” 
International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 473-495.
17      Paul Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of  War,” American Political Science Review 
82, no. 2 (1988): 423-443.
18      Dan Reiter, “Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Policy Analysis 14, 
no. 1 (2014): 61-80. See also Philipp C. Bleek and Eric B. Lorber, “Security Guarantees and Allied 
Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of  Conlict Resolution 58, no. 3 (2014): 429-454
19      Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of  Conlict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1960): Chapter 8. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Absolute Alliances: Extended Deterrence in International Politics, 
PhD Dissertation (Columbia: Columbia University, 2014), Chapter 1.
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effective ways the United States can make itself look like a willing part-
ner.20 Forward-based troops deployed in areas of vital interest do three 
things. First, they are a tangible indicator of American willingness to 
ight. Allies and adversaries can observe troop deployments and track 
troop levels. Ground troops are also expensive to garrison overseas. 
That the United States bears many of these costs offers further evidence 
it is serious about its commitments. 
Second, forward-based ground troops demonstrate the United 
States has “skin in the game.” They soothe fears the United States will 
abandon its ally in a crisis by intertwining American lives with allied 
interests. When ground troops are on allied soil, even a small conlict 
where key American interests are at stake could kill Americans. Allies 
and adversaries know the loss of American life will trigger calls for 
retribution, making it hard for American leaders to retreat. Accordingly, 
strategists argue ground troops are one of the most important ways 
the United States can make its promise to use nuclear weapons more 
credible.21 
Third, basing troops overseas also makes it more dificult to stay 
neutral in a crisis because ground troops are not easy to withdraw. Ships 
and aircraft can sail and ly away on short notice, but it takes consider-
able time and money to re-deploy thousands of ground troops. More 
importantly, extracting ground troops during a crisis entails serious 
reputational costs. Thomas Schelling captured this logic when discuss-
ing American troops in West Berlin:
..[t]he reason we got committed to Berlin, and stayed committed, is that 
if  we let the Soviets scare us out of  Berlin we would lose face with the 
Soviet (and communist Chinese) leaders. It would be bad enough to have 
Europeans, Latin Americans, and Asians think that we are immoral or cow-
ardly. It would be far worse to lose our reputation with the Soviets.22 
Recent scholarship supports these arguments, demonstrating that 
troop deployments discourage the allies who host them from acquir-
ing nuclear weapons.23 Indeed, some states have responded to troop 
withdrawals by trying to acquire nuclear weapons.24 Historians have 
shown South Korea began its nuclear program shortly after President 
Richard Nixon withdrew the 7th US Infantry Division from the Korean 
20      For a similar argument on landpower’s beneits for deterrence, see John R. Deni, “Strategic 
Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Paciic,” Parameters 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2013): 77-86.
21      Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inluence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966 [2008]), 
55.
22      Ibid. 
23      Major and unforeseen troop withdrawals make affected allies more likely to consider at least 
nuclear weapons acquisition. See Alexander Lanoszka, Protection States Trust?: Major Power Patronage, 
Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics, PhD Dissertation (Princeton: Princeton University, 2014). 
Reiter, “Security Commitments.” On alliances and nuclear proliferation, see Avery Goldstein, 
Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of  the Nuclear 
Proliferation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Bleek and Lorber, “Security Guarantees”; 
and Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of  Nuclear Proliferation,” 
International Security, 39, no. 2 (2014): 7-51.
24      Lanoszka, “Protection States Trust?”
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peninsula.25 Even West Germany, amid indications the United States was 
going to reduce its military presence in Western Europe, entered into a 
trilateral initiative with France and Italy to develop nuclear weapons.26 
In both cases, troop redeployments signaled the United States was no 
longer heeding the security interests of those allies who still confronted 
more powerful adversaries. 
American Ability
Allies and adversaries must also believe the United States can win 
on the battleield if deterrence is to work.27 Landpower is a crucial tool 
for demonstrating America’s ability to prevail. Speciically, when the 
United States puts well-trained and well-equipped ground troops on an 
ally’s territory, it substantially improves that ally’s ability to defeat an 
invasion or seize an adversary’s territory. Much of this ability derives 
from ive capabilities unique to landpower. 
First, ground forces are more survivable than air and sea forces. 
When employed correctly, ground troops can disperse, entrench, and 
camoulage.28 Consequently, they are notoriously hard to ind and eradi-
cate, even when an invader has precision weapons—a lesson the United 
States repeatedly learned in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
Second, ground forces have relatively more staying power than air 
and sea forces. Aircraft and ships must routinely stop ighting and return 
to a safe harbor or airield for fuel and maintenance.29 Though ground 
units also require logistical support, they can operate at the limits of 
human endurance and can resupply while engaged in combat. 
Third, landpower has a powerful psychological effect on invaders 
and defenders. Invaders know ground forces are inherently dificult to 
ind and destroy. When defending ground troops are well trained and 
well equipped, attacking troops know they will suffer heavier casual-
ties. Similarly, the presence of well-trained and well-equipped ground 
troops can stiffen the resolve of a defender’s political leaders. As long 
25      Lyong Choi, “The First Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 1975-1976,” Cold War 
History 14, no. 1 (2014): 71-90. See also Sung Gol Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear 
Option,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of  South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and 
Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) and Seung-Young Kim, “Security, 
Nationalism, and the Pursuit of  Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970-82,” 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 12, no. 4 (2001): 53-80.
26      Leopoldo Nuti, “The F-I-G Story Revisited,” Storia delle Relazioni Internationali 13, no. 1 
(1998): 69-100. Historian Hubert Zimmermann writes that Adenauer saw American troops as “the 
fundamental symbol of  the American commitment to Europe.” Idem, Money and Security: Troops, 
Monetary Policy, and West Germany’s Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971 (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 90. The United States repeatedly threatened troop with-
drawals from West Germany during the 1960s, thereby complicating efforts to get West Germany 
to make international commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. For one view of  these diplo-
matic travails, see Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States 
Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 91-129.
27      Steven Metz, “Has the United States Lost the Ability to Fight a Major War,” Parameters 45, 
no. 2 (Summer 2015): 7-12.
28      Biddle, Military Power, 28-51.
29      On the fuel and armament limitations of  modern American warships, see Charles C. Swicker, 
“Theater Ballistic Missile Defense From the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander,” 
The Newport Papers, no. 14 (August 1998): 30-35. For a similar analysis of  drones and ighter aircraft, 
see Martin Edmonds, “Air power and Taiwan’s security,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael Tsai, eds., 
Taiwan’s Security and Air Power: Taiwan’s Defense Against the Air Threat from Mainland China (London, 
UK: Routledge, 2004): 15. 
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as a defender still has forces on the ground, it has the means to resist 
occupation and the total loss of sovereignty.
Fourth, only landpower can hold and control territory. Although air-
craft, ships, missiles, and satellites can destroy targets on the ground and 
deny access to an area, they cannot subsequently exercise control. Only 
ground troops can do so and, more importantly, subsequently pacify 
hostile populations.30 At a minimum, landpower is a crucial comple-
ment to air and sea power. The presence of coalition ground defenses 
means invaders must deploy ground troops of its own. These invading 
ground troops will then be vulnerable to interdiction and destruction 
by coalition air and sea forces, especially as they are transported into 
theater. Collectively, forward-based American ground troops make it 
more costly to invade an American ally, deterring invasion ex ante and 
lowering its chances of success ex post. 
Finally, given its ability to seize and control territory, landpower 
allows the United States to threaten an adversary and its overseas hold-
ings with invasion. By holding an adversary’s territory at risk, landpower 
is therefore an important tool for preventing adversaries from gaining 
a competitive advantage. In peacetime, the threat of invasion compels 
adversaries to invest in defensive measures, consuming resources that 
could otherwise be spent on offensive capabilities.31 In wartime, the 
threat of an American retaliatory campaign means adversaries must hold 
troops and equipment in reserve. 
Recommendations for US Defense Policy
Three policy considerations low from our analysis.
1) Maintain the Ability to Attack On Land 
Credible security guarantees depend on allies and adversaries 
believing that American ground forces can ight and win on the ground 
in a theater dominated by precision and A2AD weapons. To clarify 
why precision and A2AD weapons threaten landpower, consider how 
long-range precision weapons could neutralize or disrupt forward-based 
troops in the earliest stages of a conlict. Command and control nodes, 
motor pools, troop barracks, supply dumps, and large combat forma-
tions are especially vulnerable to such strikes. By pre-emptively hitting 
these centers of gravity, an adversary can disorganize, disorient and 
demoralize a coalition ground force before reinforcements arrive. Even 
if forward-based ground troops withstand an initial precision strike, 
A2AD weapons will make it harder to reinforce and resupply them. 
Anti-access weapons can prevent aircraft carriers, troop transports, 
and maritime prepositioned forces from getting close enough to launch 
airstrikes, seize beachheads, or ofload gear. Meanwhile, area-denial 
weapons make it harder to establish reasonably safe aerial and seaports 
of disembarkation and allow adversaries to harass and attrite resupply 
convoys.32
30      We acknowledge the dificulties in pacifying a hostile population. Our point is simply that 
human ground troops are far more effective at the dificult task of  providing security and building 
trust than aircraft, ships and remote-controlled vehicles. 
31      An adversary can use defensive weapons for offensive purposes. Nevertheless, the doctrinal 
and training requirements for attacking and defending are different.
32      See footnote 1 for sources that describe the A2AD challenge facing the United States.
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Several intriguing proposals address the challenges raised by preci-
sion and A2AD weapons. John Gordon IV and John Matsumura suggest 
that ground troops can maintain local security and missile defense for 
air bases and naval resupply points. They can also support maneuver 
operations by using attack helicopters and drones to protect ships; and 
long-range rockets to suppress enemy air defenses.33 Andrew Krepinevich 
envisions an even more important role for landpower in East Asia. He 
wants to build a chain of linked coastal defenses throughout the so-
called First Island Chain, making A2AD China’s problem. Ground 
troops would operate early warning detection networks; lay coastal 
mines; and ire long-range torpedoes, short-range missile interceptors, 
and anti-ship cruise missiles. In the event of an invasion, American 
ground troops could serve as the backbone for allied defenders.34
These ideas suggest fascinating options for keeping landpower viable 
on future battleields. Nevertheless, they primarily articulate a defensive 
role for landpower. American forces must still be capable of undertaking 
offensive operations around the world.  Having the ability to attack on 
land does four things. First, it allows the United States to deter through 
the threat of punishment. Second, it prevents adversaries from gaining 
a competitive advantage by focusing resources on offensive measures. 
Third, it provides a hedge against salami slicing and other fait accompli 
strategies that adversaries might otherwise be tempted to use. Fourth, 
as Krepinevich points out, defensive operations in an A2AD environ-
ment may still require the United States to seize peripheral territory to 
preempt an adversary and to draw it out of its bastion.  
2) Allies are Hard to Reassure “On the Cheap”
Budget constraints and shifting strategic priorities have caused the 
United States to reduce drastically its ground forces at home and abroad. 
The US Army’s share of the defense budget is now at its lowest level in 
15 years. If current trends persist, the Army’s budget share will shrink 
to pre-Vietnam War levels. 35 Its active duty end-strength will drop to 
450,000 soldiers by iscal year 2018, representing the smallest active duty 
Army in nearly seven decades.36 
To maintain its overseas commitments in the face of these signii-
cant reductions, the Army has necessarily started to rely on rotational 
forces and prepositioned gear.37 Unfortunately, such practices may be 
less likely to reassure allies or deter adversaries. Both know it is easier, 
politically and logistically, to halt a rotational program than it is to 
withdraw permanently based forces. In other words, rotational forces 
are a less costly signal than overseas bases. To the degree allies and 
adversaries believe it is now easier for US leaders to renege in a crisis, 
American credibility will decline. Prepositioned-gear programs are even 
less likely to assure or deter. While allies and adversaries know having 
33      John Gordon and John Matsumura, The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area Denial 
Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 21-32.
34      Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense,” Foreign 
Affairs 92, no. 2 (March/April 2015): 78-86.
35      Michael O’Hanlon, The Future of  Land Warfare (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2015), 23.
36      See footnote 5 for sources on these planned reductions.
37      Kimberly Field, James Learmont and Jason Charland, “Regionally Aligned Forces: Business 
Not as Usual,” Parameters 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2013): 55-63; Julian Barnes, “US Army Chief  Plans Steps 
to Mitigate Reduction of  American Forces in Europe,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2015.  
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gear in theater will make it easier to deploy American ground forces in 
a crisis, they also know prepositioned-gear does not make it more likely 
that the United States will intervene as promised. In some respects, 
prepositioned-gear may even be tantamount to cheap talk in the minds 
of allies and adversaries. Such perceptions are especially likely if the 
United States prepositions antiquated or poorly maintained equipment. 
A2AD threats make it even harder for the United States to assure or 
deter with prepositioned-gear. Given the degree to which the United 
States has allowed its forcible entry capability to atrophy, there is no 
guarantee US ground troops will be able to arrive in theater, link up 
with their prepositioned equipment and deploy into combat formations 
without absorbing unacceptable casualties. 
The United States should therefore reevaluate its decision to cut 
deeply into Army force structure. Although we are not in a position to 
specify the Army’s ideal size, any end-strength that forces Army leaders 
to substitute rotational and regionally aligned forces for permanently 
based units should be considered too small. Given such considerations, 
an end-strength of approximately 500,000 active-duty soldiers seems 
more appropriate given the Army’s strategic requirements.38 It should 
likewise consider maintaining more forward-based troops in Europe 
than might seem strictly justiied by the so-called “pivot to Asia.” We 
admit to the dificulty of pursuing this course of action while the 2011 
Budget Control Act (BCA) remains in effect. Increased reliance on Total 
Force may be one way to minimize the inevitable opportunity cost of 
maintaining a larger ground force. 
3) Prepare for a Major Shift in Ground Doctrine  
Maintaining the ability to attack on land in the face of precision 
and A2AD weapons will require profound changes to existing doctrine. 
Operational concepts, including the Joint Operational Access Concept 
and the Joint Concept for Entry Operations, are critical steps in the right 
direction because they identify a framework for innovation.39 However, 
history suggests when it comes to doctrinal change, the devil is in the 
details. History offers an example in the nineteenth-century irepower 
revolution, which also made it easier to defend than attack. Europe’s 
armies nearly annihilated themselves trying to igure out how to attack 
during the First World War. The difference between success and failure 
on the Western Front turned at least as much on tactics, techniques, 
and procedures as it did on broad operational concepts.40 Accordingly, 
(although it is important to spend on mobility/counter-mobility assets) 
research and development in the areas of forcible entry from air, space, 
and sea, distributed land operations, and tactical experimentation must 
remain a priority.   
38      John Evans, Getting it Right: Determining the Optimal Active Component End Strength of  the All-
Volunteer Army to Meet the Demands of  the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings, June 2015).
39      US Department of  Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington, DC: US Department 
of  Defense, January 17, 2012); US Department of  Defense, Joint Concept for Entry Operations 
(Washington, DC: US Department of  Defense, April 7, 2014).
40      Michael Hunzeker, Perfecting War: The Organizational Sources of  Doctrinal Innovation, PhD 
Dissertation (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013), Chapters 4-7.
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Conclusion
The rebalance to Asia, the drawdown in Afghanistan, war weariness 
at home, and the BCA have led American defense planners to prioritize 
sea and air power over landpower. Such shifts are sensible, but they 
should not obscure the important relationship between landpower and 
American credibility. Landpower—especially in the form of forward 
deployed ground troops—helps make American security guarantees 
believable. Ground troops have this effect because they symbolize 
willingness (by acting as a tripwire) and possess ability (by being effec-
tive in combat). Precision weapons and A2AD assets target landpower 
capabilities because the former lets adversaries destroy forward-based 
troops from afar while the latter makes it dificult to reinforce them. 
These capabilities are as much a threat to landpower in Europe as they 
are in East Asia and the Middle East. As allies and adversaries around 
the world begin to doubt the combat effectiveness of American ground 
troops, they are more likely to ind American credibility suspect. For 
these reasons, the effectiveness of American landpower must be assured.
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